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Remedies for Non-Citizens under
Provincial Nominee Programs:
Judicial Review and Fiduciary
Relationships

In Canada, more and more people get permanent residency under Provincial
and Territorial Nominee Programs (PTNPs). Despite this new reality, there is today
no detailed examination of the consequences of PTNPs for immigrants' rights
and protections. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap. As we show, PTNPs have
no statutory basis and officials who administer these programs do not exercise
statutory authority of any kind. An alternative would be that these programs
become "law"; then the decisions made under them would be judicially reviewable
for conformity with that law. However, it is unlikely to happen because "flexibility"
is seen as the key characteristic of PTNPs. We contend that the concept of a
fiduciary relationship and fiduciary obligation has evolved greatly in the last
decades in Canadian law, and we suggest, as an alternative to judicial review,
extending a fiduciary duty to public decision makers. As in any new subject area
of research, we hope that our findings will form the basis for further study on this
understudied, and yet very important topic.

Les personnes qui obtiennent la residence permanente par le biais des
Programmes des candidats des provinces et des territoires (ci-apres PCPTs) sont
de plus en plus nombreuses au Canada. Malgre cette nouvelle realite, il n'existe
pas, a Iheure actuelle, d'examen detaille portant sur les consequences de ces
programmes pour les droits et protections des etrangers. Dans cet article, nous
souhaitons combler le vide en la matiere. Nous montrons que les PCPTs n'ont pas
de fondement legislatif et les fonctionnaires administrent donc ces programmes
sans autorite legale. Une alternative pourrait 6tre que les provinces ou territoires
edictent ces programmes sous forme de loi, ce qui permettrait alors aux tribunaux
d'evaluer la conformite de ces decisions en fonction de ce que prescrit la loi.
Cependant, il est peu probable que cela se produise, car la caracteristique
premiere de ce programmes, c'est leur , flexibilite.. Nous pretendons que les
concepts de , relation fiduciaire - et d', obligation fiduciaire - ont connu une
evolution importante dans le droit canadien au cours des dernieres decennies,
et nous suggerons qu'une alternative a la revision judiciaire pourrait se trouver
dans la reconnaissance d'une obligation fiduciaire du decideur public envers
le candidat a I'immigration sous les PCPTs. Comme pour tout nouveau sujet de
recherche, nous esperons que nos conclusions susciteront d'autres etudes sur
ce sujet encore peu explore, et pourtant tres important.

*
Delphine Nakache (dnakacheauottawa.ca) is a law professor at the School of International
Development and Global Studies (University of Ottawa). Catherine Blanchard (c.blanchard students.
uu.nl) is a masters student in Public International Law at Utrecht University (The Netherlands). We
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Introduction
Canada shares with Australia, New Zealand and the United States the
tradition of being a country of immigrants, and it has long maintained a
fairly centralized immigration system to pursue immigration as part of its
ongoing project of nation building.1 Such centralization is supported by a
constitutional division of powers: in Canada, immigration is a matter of

shared federal/provincial jurisdiction, but in case of a conflict between
a federal and a provincial law the former prevails.2 However, Canada
has recently experienced the devolution of some powers to sub-national
levels in immigrant selection, as is evident through the development of
Provincial and Territorial Nominee programs (PTNPs). 3

1. Jeffrey G Reitz, "Tapping Immigrants' Skills: New Directions for Canadian Immigration
Policy in the Knowledge Economy" (2005) 11:1 IRPP Choices at 2; Peter J Spiro, "Federalism and
Immigration: Models and Trends" (2001) 53:167 Intl Social Science J 67 at 71.
2.
ConstitutionAct, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 95, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
3. "In the [mid-90s], some Canadian provinces took advantage of the federal government's offer to
develop devolved immigration settlement and integration services and agreements. Thus, according to
the existing federal/provincial agreements, Manitoba and British Columbia could manage their own
language training and jobs programs for newcomers using federal funds. However, in April 2012, the
federal government announced that it would resume management of settlement services in British
Columbia (effective April 2014) and Manitoba (effective April 2013), noting that 'integration of
newcomers is a nation-building responsibility.' Manitoba Premier delivered a stinging public rebuke
in response, claiming the federal government was attempting to destroy a successful program that
has brought [more than 100,000] immigrants to Manitoba since its inception in the 1990s. Manitoba
Immigration Minister also deplored the fact that this 'unilateral decision' had been made 'without
consultation' with the province." Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, eds, Immigration Regulation
in Federal States: Challenges and Responses in Comparative Perspective (Springer, 2014) at 96.

For more on this topic, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Government of
Canada to Strengthen Responsibility for Integration of Newcomers: 'Integration Services Are about
Nation Building', says Kenney" (12 April 2012) online: Canada's Economic Action Plan <http://www.
actionplan.gc. ca/en/news/government-canada-strengthen-responsibility-integration-newcomersintegration-services-are>. See also "Manitoba angry about federal immigration changes" (12 April
2012), online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-angry-about-federalimmigration-changes-1.1174711>.
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In Canada, the immigration system comprises three streams, each
corresponding to major program objectives: family (reuniting families),
economic (contributing to economic development) and refugee (protecting
refugees).' Provincial and territorial nominees belong to the economic
stream. According to section 87 of the ImmigrationandRefugee Protection
Regulations, the provincial nominee class is "a class of persons who
may become permanent residents on the basis of their ability to become
economically established in Canada."5 Thus, provincial and territorial
nominees are considered economic migrants, along with skilled workers,
business immigrants and live-in caregivers.6 Provincial and territorial
nominees are workers designated by a province or territory that has entered
into agreements with the Government of Canada to select immigrants
who will meet their local economic needs. Depending on the stream and
category, nominee applicants may apply from abroad or within Canada.
While these nominees must meet federal health and security admission
criteria, they are not subject to the federal skilled worker selection grid
for determining eligibility. Thus, the immigration process under PTNPs
involves two major stages: (1) potential immigrants submit applications
to a given province/territory which nominates them for immigration; (2)
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) conducts security, criminality
7
and health checks and makes a final decision on whether to issue a visa.
Once successful applicants have been issued a visa and present the visa at
a Canadian port of entry (or at a CIC office in Canada if the applicant is
already here and has valid temporary resident status) they are granted their
permanent residence status.'

4.

These objectives are expressly stated in the Immigration andRefugee Protection Act, SC 2001,

c 27 [IRPA]. See, more specifically, s 3 (1) c), d) and s 3 (2).
5.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 87(1) [IRPR].

6.
In July 2014 the skilled worker component included immigrants meeting federal selection
criteria that assessed the candidate's overall capacity to adapt to Canada's labour market. These
criteria took into consideration factors such as education, English or French language abilities,
and work experience. The skilled worker component was comprised of the Federal Skilled Worker
Program (FSWP), the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) and the Federal Skilled Trades Program
(FSTP). The business immigrant component included those who invest their money in an approved
venture and those who intend to be self-employed. The live-in caregiver component included previous
temporary migrant workers who were granted permanent residence after their participation in the
Live-in Caregiver Program.
7.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, OP 7b Provincial Nominees, Operational Manuals

(2010), online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/op/op07b-eng.pdf>.
8. IRPR, supra note 5, ss 71 and 87.
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Currently, all provinces and territories, with the exception of Quebec9
and Nunavut, have PTNPs. Over the years that PTNPs have been in
existence (since 1999),"o these programs have grown a great deal, from
477 permanent residents (or 0.9 per cent of the economic stream) in
1999 to 40, 899 (or twenty-five per cent of the economic stream) in 2012
(17,200 principal applicants and 23,699 spouses and dependants).11 CIC
became concerned that as a result of PTNP growth, fewer economic
immigrants would be admitted through the federal skilled worker class,
which had traditionally (and until recently) been the primary source of
economic immigrants. CIC then implemented in 2009 a national limit
of 17,065 principal applicants for the country as a whole and for each
participating province/territory. However, given ongoing calls from a
number of provincial premiers for the limits to be raised, this limit was
increased to 20,665 for 2010 and to 22,315 for 2013. For 2014, the target
for PTNP admissions (principal applicants, spouses and dependants) has
been set at between 44,500 and 47,000. If met, this will constitute a record
level for the program. 12 It is also worth noting that several provinces and
territories have recently welcomed more permanent residents through
PTNPs than any of the other federal immigration streams (94.7 per cent
of all permanent residents in Prince Edward Island, 91.1 per cent of all
permanent residents in Manitoba, 56 per cent of all permanent residents
in Yukon).13
The increase in provincial/territorial nominees is driven by three
major factors: (1) the pursuit of efficiency of immigration management,
(2) the challenges centralized immigration systems face in responding to
diverse regional needs/concerns, and (3) recent changes to the Federal
Skilled Worker Program (FSWP). The "race for talent" and international

9.

Quebec has not established a PTNP. According to the Canada Quebec Accord relating to

immigration and temporary admissionsof aliens, signed in 1991, Quebec possesses its own particular

competencies regarding the selection and settlement of immigrants to the province. Quebec establishes
its own programs and processes in immigration related matters.
10. Manitoba was the first province to sign an agreement in 1996 and it started operating its PTNP
in 1999. The Northwest Territories signed an agreement most recently, in 2009 and consequently has
the newest PTNP, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the ProvincialNominee
Program,(2011) at 15 [CIC,Evaluation].
11.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2012

Immigration overview:

Permanent and temporary residents (2013), online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/
facts2012/permanentl/02.asp> [CIC, Tables 2012].
12. For more on this topic, see F Leslie Seidle, Canadas Provincial Nominee Immigration
Programs:Securing GreaterPolicy Alignment, (2013) IRPP Study No 43 at 8, online: IRPP <irpp.

org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research/diversity -immigration-and-integration/canadas -immigrationprograms/Seidle-No43.pdf> [Seidle].
13.

CIC, Evaluation, supra note 10 at 20.
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competitiveness in immigration matters14 has created space for Canadian
provinces and territories to develop their own immigrant selection
programs. The premise underlying this trend is that the provinces and
territories are better equipped than the federal immigration system to
respond to particular local needs, help quicker labour market integration
of newcomers, and resolve uneven newcomer settlement.15 What is more,
the FSWP traditionally allowed for admission of workers in all skilled
occupations (based on their prospective employability assessed under
the points system). However, following criticisms that this approach
was insufficiently linked to existing labour market needs,16 the federal
government introduced in 2012 strict eligibility rules and changed the
points system, 7 which has led to a drastic diminution of the pool of
those who could apply under the FSWP. Since fewer skilled workers are
eligible to apply under the FSWP or qualify under the new points system,
they may have an incentive to use PTNPs as an alternative pathway to
permanent residency. In addition to the above factors, other current policy
trends-increasingly employer-driven admission and growth of two-step
migration-support further expansion of PTNPs. In fact, an increasing
number ofimmigration programs in Canada are employer-driven, requiring
either a job offer or Canadian experience in order to apply. Further, unlike

14. Ayelet Shachar, "The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration
Regimes" (2006) 81 NYUL Rev 148.
15. Settlement patterns in Canada are characterized by uneven distribution of newcomers across
the country. Between 1995 and 2008, over 80% of newcomers settled in British Columbia, Ontario,
Quebec and their metropolises, while other regions often "starved" for newcomers: Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Immigration overview: Permanent and temporary residents (2008), online: CIC
<www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/index.asp>. It should be noted, however, that
although these provinces continue to be the top destinations for newcomers, there have been some
changes in settlement patterns in Canada over the last decade. For example, the share of newcomers in
certain Western provinces, including Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta has increased from 9% of
the total annual intake in 2000 to 20% in 2010. At the same time, the number of newcomers destined
for Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia has declined from 89% in 2000 to 77% in 2010; see
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2010-Immigration overview: Permanent
and temporary residents (2010), online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts20l0/
index.asp>.
16. Delphine Nakache & Paula J Kinoshita, "The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Do
Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over Human Rights Concerns?" (2010) IRPP Study No 5.
17. It should be noted that the eligibility criteria under the FSWP are changing regularly. For
example, in February 2014 only three groups were eligible to apply under the FSWP: (1) persons
with experience in listed occupations in demand; (2) skilled workers with a job offer; (3) international
students enrolled in PhD programs in Canada. In July 2014, Citizenship and Immigration Canada
requested that every applicant in each of the three groups listed above also has at least one year of
continuous and paid skilled work experience in Canada in a single occupation within the last 10 years.
What's more, under the revised points system, language has become the most important selection
factor; points for Canadian work experience have been increased while points for foreign work
experience have been reduced; and the emphasis on younger immigrants has become stronger.
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in the past when most candidates applied for permanent residence from
abroad, there is an increasing preference for two-step migration whereby a
person is first admitted on a temporary basis as an "international student"
or "temporary foreign worker," and later allowed to transition to permanent
residence. These points are discussed in more detail below, and it is shown
that PTNPs fit both of these trends, as they usually make a job offer a
precondition for nomination and/or require previous work experience with
a local employer. Thus, PTNPs are becoming an integral and long-lasting
feature of Canadian immigration programs-a development that requires
close scrutiny of their implications.
In the past decade, provinces and territories have been given
progressively more leeway in how to design their selection programs and
how to administer and evaluate them. This has resulted in great diversity
of PTNP streams, criteria and sizes: there are today over 50 PTNP streams
operating in 11 Canadian provinces/territories. 8 While "provinces have
become active players in devising immigration programs that complement
and at times replace their federal counterpart,"19 this significant change in
immigration policy is occurring with little academic study and debate. For
a long time, certain aspects of PTNPs were only examined in the context
of specific-issue studies such as multi-level governance, 0 attraction and

18. It is worth mentioning, however, that all PTNPs currently have operational Skilled Worker
streams, most of which require a full-time job offer from a local employer. Furthermore, every PTNP
has, or has had a Business stream in the past. Finally, most PTNPs now have a Semi-Skilled Worker,
International Student Graduate and Family Connection stream. See CIC, Evaluation, supra note 10 at
15-16. See also Delphine Nakache & Sarah D'Aoust, "Provincial and Territorial Nominee Programs:
An Avenue to Permanent Residency for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in Canada?" in Christine
Straehle & Patti Tamara Lenard, eds, PartialMembers: Low-Skilled Temporary LabourMigrants in
Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012) at 165.
19. Harriet Nijboer, Federal-ProvincialRelationson Immigration:Striking the Right Balance (LLM

Thesis, Graduate Department of Law, University of Toronto, 2010) [unpublished] at 1.
20. Christopher Leo & Martine August, "The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and Settlement:
Making Deep Federalism Work" (2009) 42:2 Can J Political Science 491; Christopher Leo, "Deep
Federalism: Respecting Community Difference in National Policy" (2006) 39:3 Can J Political
Science 481.
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retention of immigrants, 1 labour market integration of newcomers,"
economic immigration policy,23 and regionalization of migration.24 A
more critical scholarship on PTNPs has only started to emerge. Seidle,
for example, highlights the lack of communication between the federal,
provincial and territorial governments regarding PTNPs. He argues that
decisions are not sufficiently informed by the experience of other provinces
and territories. He also shows that practice is not always consistent with
the stated objectives of the program. According to Seidle, the federal and
participating provincial/territorial governments should urgently work
together to better coordinate their actions in this area.2 Lewis, writing
specifically about the nominee program in Manitoba, explains that the
privatized nature of recruitment and settlement that is characteristic of
PTNPs (due to great reliance on employers and ethnic community groups)

has resulted in ethnocultural inequality of new arrivals, with privileges
given to certain ethnic communities (the ones that are better established
in Manitoba tend to nominate and provide settlement services to persons
with the same ethnocultural affiliation).26 Dobrowolsky, looking at the
Nova Scotia nominee program, raises concerns about the gender and

Graeme Hugo & Kevin Harris, Population distributioneffects of migrationin Australia,Report
for Department of Immigration and Citizenship, (Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, 2011),
online: IMMI <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/migration-in-austmlia/full-report.
pdf>; Tom Carter, Manish Pandey & James Townsend, "The Manitoba Provincial Nominee Program:
Attraction, Integration and Retention of Immigrants" (2010) IRPP Study No 10, online: IRPP <irpp.
org/wp-contentl/uploads/assets/research/diversity-immigration-integration/the-manitoba-provincialnominee-program!IRPP-study-nol0.pdf>; Daniel Hiebert & Kathy Sherell, "The Integration and
Inclusion of Newcomers in British Columbia" Metropolis British Columbia, Working PaperSeries
(November 2009), online: MBC <mbc.metropolis.netl/assets/uploads/files/wp/2009/WP09-11.pdf>;
Ather H Akbari & Jennifer S Harrington, "Initial Location Choice of New Immigrants to Canada"
Atlantic Metropolis, Center Working Paper Series (2007), online: Atlantic Metorpolis <community.
smu.ca/atlantic/documents/AkbariandHarringtonWP5.pdf>; Tracy Derwing et al, "The Attraction and
Retention of Immigrants to Edmonton: A Case Study of a Medium Sized Canadian City" Prairie
Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration, Working Paper Series (2006),
online: PCERII <www.ualberta.ca/npcerii/WorkingPapers/WP05-05.pdf>.
22. ManishPandey & James Townsend, "Provincial Nominee Programs: An Evaluation of Earnings
and Retention Rates of Nominees" University of Winnipeg, Department ofEconomics Working Paper
(2010), online: The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics <economics.uwinnipeg.ca/
RePEc/winwop/2010-01.pdf>.
23. Naomi Alboim, "Adjusting the Balance: Fixing Canada's Economic Immigration Policies"
Maytree Report (2009), online: Maytree <www.maytree.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/
adjustingthebalance-final.pdf>.
24. Graeme Hugo, "Immigrant Settlement Outside of Australia's Capital Cities" (2008) 14:6
Population, Space & Place 553.
25. Seidle, supra note 12.
26. Nathaniel M Lewis, "A Decade Later: Assessing Successes and Challenges in Manitoba's
Provincial Immigrant Nominee Program" (2010) 36:2 Can Public Policy 241.
21.
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class impact of PTNPs.27 She also highlights the neoliberal nature of the
program, designated as a form of "immigration marketization," and its
impact on the structure and agency of various actors involved at the subnational level.28 Baglay, D'Aoust and Nakache, who have looked at the
impact of PTNPs on temporary migrant workers, have shown that PTNPs
provide these workers with certain benefits (such as greater opportunities
to change from a temporary to a permanent resident status from within
Canada), but at the same time have raised a number of concerns, such
as an increased dependence on employers and difficulty navigating these
programs.29 Finally, recent conference papers by immigration lawyers have
briefly identified specific legal issues related to PTNPs (long processing
times, changes to programs without notice and lack of appeals).3 However,
written by and for practitioners, these short papers focus primarily on
practical issues faced by immigration lawyers. There is thus no detailed
examination of the consequences of PTNPs for immigrants' rights and
protections. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by showing that the
absence of a clear legal framework for PTNPs is likely to negatively affect
the fundamental right of non-citizens to challenge a negative decision
from the province or territory regarding their application to the nominee
program.
If an applicant obtains a PTNP nomination at the provincial or
territorial level and is subsequently denied permanent resident status at the
federal level (i.e., by a federal decision-maker), the available mechanism
is clear: the applicant may apply to the Federal Court for leave to judicially
review this refusal. This is because the final decision regarding permanent
residence lies with CIC (i.e., after the nomination has been granted by
the provincial or territorial decision-maker). Thus, "at this point in the
process, a [permanent residency] refusal of a provincial nominee is like any

27. Alexandra Dobrowolsky, "The Intended and Unintended Effects of a New Immigration Strategy:
Insights from Nova Scotia's Provincial Nominee Program" (2011) 87 Studies in Political Economy
109.
28. Alexandra Dobrowolsky, "Nuancing Neoliberalism: Lessons Learned from a Failed Immigration
Experiment" (2013) 14:2 J Intl Migration & Integration 197.
29. Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, "The Implications of Immigration Federalism for Noncitizens' Rights and Immigration Opportunities: Canada and Australia Compared" (2013) American
Rev Can Studies 43:3; Nakache & D'Aoust, supra note 18 at 165-169.
30. Alan Diner, "Protection Nominee Positions: A review of PNPs and their Jurisprudence" (Paper
delivered at the Carleton County Law Association, March 2012) [unpublished]; Mario D Bellissimo,
"Provincial Nominee Certificate Refusals: Any Relieft" (2011) 99 Imm LR (3d) 262; Jolene Otieno &
Veronica Cheng, "Top 10 Issues in Provincial Nominee Programs: Western Canada (British Columbia,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba)" (Paper presented to the National Citizenship and Immigration
Law Conference of the CanadianBarAssociation, 13-15 May 2010), online: CBA <www.cba.org/cba/
cle/PDF/ImmlO Cheng Otienojiaper.pdf>.
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other [permanent residency] refusal." 1 The vast majority of the available
jurisprudence with respect to provincial nominees focuses on applicants at
this stage in the process (i.e., post nomination), who are seeking redress
for permanent residence refusals based on failures to fulfill or comply with
legislative requirements,32 principally of the IRPA.3 For example, the most
common rejection of an application for permanent residence as a member
of the PTNP class is due to inadmissibility, on grounds such as security
(IRPA, s. 34(1)), criminality (IRPA, s. 36(1)), health (IRPA, s. 38(1)), or
misrepresentations (IRPA, s. 40(1)(a)). However, to date, the law does
not provide a clear indication as to which remedies are available to an
applicant at the provincial/territorial stage should a PTNP nomination be
refused by a provincial or territorial decision-maker.3 4 Applicants in some
provinces may request reconsideration of the PTNP nomination refusal,
but this is not a formal appeal process, since the reconsideration takes
place at the program level.35 As we explain further, judicial review to the
applicable provincial court is the most viable option for a PTNP applicant
who wants to challenge a negative decision at the provincial or territorial
level. But unfortunately, because of the very special configuration of
PTNPs (i.e., neither the requirements for granting PTNP nomination, nor
the authority for provinces to make PTNP nomination decisions are set out
31.

Bellissimo, supra note 30 at 265.

32. See, e.g., Moumivand v Canada(Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FC 157, [2011]
FCJ no 354 (QL); Ma v Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC
1042, [2009] FCJ no 1283 (QL); Baybazarovv Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2010
FC 665 [2010] FCJ no 950 (QL); Ni v Canada(Ministerof Citizenship& Immigration), 2010 FC 162,
2010 CarswellNat 6177 (WL Can); Wai v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2009 FC
780, 348 CarswellNat 660 (WL Can); Guan v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2009
FC 274, cited in Bellissimo, supra note 30 at 265. In July 2014, a dozen other cases regarding post-

certificate matters have been rendered by the Federal Court (at least since Bellissimo's article was
published in Fall 2011).
33.

IRPA, supra note 4.

34.

In fact, the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench did recently render the first Canadian decision

regarding the review of a decision under a PTNP: Jiang v Manitoba (Minister of Labour and
Immigration), 2013 MIBQB 107, 292 Man R (2d) 76 [Jiang]. The court rejected an application

for certiorari of a PTNP refusal. As stated in para 36 of the decision, "[T]his was the first time a
superior court in Canada had been asked to review a decision under a provincial nominee program."
To our knowledge, there is also the filed case C112-01-76940 Ioc Ip Lau, applicant, and Manitoba
(MinisterofLabour and Immigration), respondent,which application has been made in January 2012,

regarding the refusal of a Manitoba PNP application on the ground that the applicant did not meet
the requirements. The case has been adjourned sine die in March 2012. According to Diner, supra

note 30 at 7, regarding other pre-nomination matters that have been reported, "the government of
Manitoba settled on the first judicial review in 2009" and "in Newfoundland, counsel challenged
a nomination withdrawal three years ago under the certiorari provisions of the NL Rules, but the
government capitulated."
35. Some provinces provide the PTNP applicant with some kind of internal review process for
nomination refusals, but these review processes are not statutorily based and should be more properly
seen as "reconsideration requests" or re-applications. For more details, see Diner, supra note 30.
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in provincial or territorial legislation), this route is not without obstacles
for PTNP applicants. Clearly, the structure of PTNPs must be questioned
because it leaves PTNP applicants with an unsatisfactory recourse at the
provincial stage. But we also need to think outside the traditional box of
judicial review, and see how we can best take into consideration the unique
relationship between PTNP applicants and provincial/territorial decision
makers in this area.
Our paper is divided in two parts. In Part I we offer an analysis of
possible means of challenging a nomination refusal at the provincial or
territorial level and contend that the absence of a legal framework for
PTNPs is such that decision makers who exercise public power in their
respective province or territory are not held accountable for exercising
their power in conformity with law, as is the case at the federal level.
Our objective here is not to say that these decision makers exercise
their power in abusive, discriminatory or pernicious ways, but rather
that this discretionary power is ambiguous and problematic because
it is not authorized by law. In Part II we show that the concept of a
fiduciary relationship and fiduciary obligation has evolved greatly in the
last decades in Canadian law, and that it has clearly expanded beyond
its original application to trustees and beneficiaries in the private-law
setting. We then suggest that, in the specific context of PTNP applicants,
the unique nature, framework, and functioning of the programs could
lead the provincial (or territorial) decision maker to owe a fiduciary duty
towards applicants, a duty stemming from procedural rights and legitimate
expectations. Challenging a possible breach of this duty could become a
new path towards recourses for applicants. Our criticism of the absence
of a legal framework for PTNPs gives us the opportunity to probe deeper
into the unique relationship that exists between provincial and territorial
decision makers and non-citizens, and to look at the foundation of this
relationship. As in any new subject area of research, we hope therefore that
our findings will form the basis for further study on this understudied, and
yet very important topic.
I.

Legal recoursesfor PTNP applicantsat the provincial/territorial
level: are provinces and territoriesgoverning arbitrarily?
Under the authorities of section 8(1) of the IRPA and section 5(1) of the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act,36 PTNPs operate under
individual agreements between the federal government and each province
and territory. Subsection 8(1) of the IRPA reads as follows:

36.

Departmentof Citizenship and ImmigrationAct, SC 1994, c 31, s 5(1).
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The Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, may enter
into an agreement with the government of any province for the purposes
of this Act. The Minister must publish, once a year, a list of the federalprovincial agreements that are in force.
Thus, in order to establish a PTNP, each province and territory
is required to sign an agreement with CIC, which, along with other
immigration matters, outlines the specific roles and responsibilities of
the province/territory and the federal government. Specific terms of
agreement vary between nominee programs, but they generally set out
that the province or territory is responsible for assessing and nominating
the candidates, and that CIC retains the sole authority to grant permanent
37
resident status to the nominee.
Although provinces and territories are responsible for the nomination
of PTNP applicants, the power of the provinces and territories to make
these decisions flows exclusively from federal legislation (IRPA). There is
no equivalent provincial or territorial legislation for PTNPs; the programs
are solely policy-based. The very particular nature of these programs
was recently the subject of a succinct-but very useful-explanation by
Schwann J. of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench in a case related
to alleged fraudulent acts of a PTNP consultant. Justice Schwann described
the Saskatchewan Immigration Nominee Program as follows:
3 [The] Saskatchewan Immigration Nominee Program ("SINP")...
is the provincial off shoot of legislative responsibilities and programs
administered by the Government of Canada.. .under the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.... Essentially, the SINP program dovetails and
37.

For example, the Canada Manitoba Immigration Agreement stipulates, at s 0.17, "The Parties

Hereto agree on the following: ...b. [That] Canada will determine national policy objectives and annual
plans for the immigration program; it will be responsible for the selection, admission and control of
immigrants and temporary residents and refugee claimants ... c. [That] Manitoba will advise Canada
regarding its annual immigration levels plans; and d. [That] Manitoba will exercise its responsibilities
in the development and implementation of programs; policies and legislation; facilitating promotion
and recruitment of immigrants; determination of provincial nominees; and the provision of settlement
and integration services as set out in this Agreement.": Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada
Manitoba Immigration Agreement (2003), online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-

policy/agreements/manitoba/can-man-2003.asp> [CIC, Canada ManitobaAgreement]. Similarly, the
Canada OntarioImmigrationAgreement, Annex C: Pilot Provincial Nominee program, s4.1 provides

that "Ontario has the sole and non-transferable responsibility to assess and nominate candidates,"
while s 4.7 stipulates that "Canada will: (a) exercise the final selection; (b) determine the admissibility
of the nominee and his or her dependants with respect to legislative requirements including health,
criminality and security; and (c) issue immigrant visas to provincial nominees and accompanying
dependants who meet all the admissibility requirements of the IRPA and IRPR.": Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Canada Ontario Immigration Agreement (November 2005), online: CIC

<www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/agreements/ontario/ont-2005-agree.asp>.

See also,

generally, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Federal Provincial/TerritorialAgreements (2010),

online: CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/agreements/index.asp>.
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feeds into the federal immigration mandate by enabling Saskatchewan to
select provincial nominees for landed immigrant status in Canada. SINP
is not establishedpursuant to specific legislative authority.It derives its
authoritypursuantto 'managementdirectionfrom the broader, umbrella
legislative mandate of the Ministry. In this respect the processes,forms,
guidelines, criteria,requirements, evaluation and decision making, etc.
were all createdand are governed by broad basedministerialpolicy. As
succinctly put by the Ministry, the program has no statutory basis and
the officials who administerit do not exercise statutory authority of any
kind.38
This legal vacuum negatively affects the right of any PTNP applicant
to seek legal remedies at the provincial or territorial stage, should a
provincial or territorial decision maker refuse a PTNP nomination.
Clearly, a true appeal based on the merit of the case is not an option for
any PTNP applicant. First, there must be a statutory provision allowing
for such an appeal and determining its scope, and in the case at hand,
there is no legislation governing the PTNP process or creating the court,
tribunal or other judicial or administrative authority that is competent
to hear an appeal. Second, even if some provinces or territories provide
PTNP applicants with some kind of internal review process for nomination
refusals, as we have explained earlier, these review processes are not
statutorily based and should be more properly seen as "reconsideration
requests" or re-applications. 39 Administrative review of nomination
decisions is not an option either because there is no administrative tribunal
to hear matters dealing directly with nomination under the PTNPs.4" As
for judicial review by the Federal Court, it cannot be performed either.
Indeed, federal-provincial and territorial agreements are today the only
source of legislative authority for PTNPs, and subsection 72 (1) of JRPA
and paragraph 18.1 (3)(a) of the Federal Courts Act41 only deal with
decisions of federal decision makers, not decisions of provincial/territorial

38.

Kaberwal v Saskatchewan (Ministry of the Economy), 2013 SKQB 244, 424 Sask R 144

[emphasis added].
39.

For more information on reconsideration processes, see supra note 35.

40. See Chris Rootham, "Are there distinct standards of'Administrative Review'?" Nelligan 0 'Brien
Payne (2003) at 3, online: Nelligan <www.nelligan.ca/e pdf/AdministrativeReview CR.pdf>.
41. FederalCourtsAct, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1 (3)(a). Section 18.1 (3)(a) states: "On an application
for judicial review, the Federal Court may (a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do
any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing.....
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decision makers. 4' In fact, application for judicial review at the provincial
court level is the only appropriate route, but there are pitfalls along the
way, as we show in the following paragraphs.
Judicial review is an essential administrative law process because it
does exist to ensure that decision makers have not exercised their power
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada have made it clear that the standard applicable to most judicial
reviews would be one of reasonableness.43 In fact, in Mowat, the norm of
correctness has clearly been circumscribed to four particular situations:
constitutional questions, questions of law that are of central importance
to the legal system as a whole and that are outside the adjudicator's
expertise... '[q]uestions regarding the jurisdictional lines between two
or more competing specialized tribunals'..., [and] tme questions of
jurisdiction or vires.?
Since the situation of PTNPs falls outside these categories, deference
is likely to be afforded to decision makers, and the reviewing court will
intervene only if the decision does not fall "within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect ofthe facts and law."45
This deference towards decision makers stems precisely from the
discretionary power granted to them. Usually, such discretion has to be
expressly attributed, and its scope is normally established in enabling
statutes. For example, the broad discretionary power granted to the
Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board

42. Section 72 (1) of IRPA, supra note 4, states: "Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect
to any matter-a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised-under
this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court." This position was further
clarified by the Federal Court inAulakh v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), [2005]

FCJ no 212 (QL), at para 4: "I am satisfied that Manitoba's Provincial nominee program is not a
'Federal Board commission, or other tribunal' as defined by section 2 (1) of the Federal [Court] Act.
The decision being the subject of the application for leave and judicial review therefore falls outside
the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to judicially review, as established by the Federal Court Act,
s.18.1 (3)(a)."
43. See, e.g., Canada(CanadianHuman Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011
SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 [Mowat]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta
Teachers 'Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR 654 ; Newfoundland andLabradorNurses' Union
v Newfoundland andLabrador(TreasuryBoard), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708; McLean v British
Columbia (SecuritiesCommission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 SCR 895; and, generally, DunsmuirvNew
Brunswick. 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].

44.

Mowat, supra note 43 at para 18 [references omitted].

45.

Dunsmuir, supra note 43 at para 47.
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stems from section 67 of the IRPA. 6 However, in the case of PTNPs,
where does the discretionary power of provincial and territorial decision
makers come from? From the division of powers and obligations related
to immigration found in federal-provincial agreements, which are of no
legislative or regulatory nature?
This question, for which there is no answer, highlights that provinces
may govern arbitrarily, not because their civil servants are exercising their
power in a abusive manner, but simply because their power is not authorized
and delineated by law. An important dimension of provincial and territorial
decision makers' discretion is that the requirements for granting a PTNP
nomination (i.e., the specific criteria set out by the province or territory
to assess nominations) are also not found in any provincial/territorial
legislation (since there is no such legislation). All provinces and territories
with a nominee program make available, on their individual websites,
information regarding the application process, eligibility requirements and
necessary forms. Some nominee programs even supply applicants with
guidelines and manuals explaining the selection process and the role of
every agent, officer or public decision maker involved in the process.47
Yet none of these documents can be considered as having legal authority.48
Interestingly, each CIC-provincial and -territorial agreement makes clear
that "procedures and criteria for nomination" established by the province
or territory must be followed by them.49 But does this mean that failure to
follow such "procedures and criteria" would trigger review? Here again,

46. IRPA, supra note 4, section 67 reads as follows: "67 (1) To allow an appeal, the Immigration
Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at the time that the appeal is disposed of,
(a) the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact;
(b) a principle of natural justice has not been observed; or
(c) other than in the case of an appeal by the Minister, taking into account the best
interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian and
compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances
of the case."
47. See, e.g., Government of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program, SINP
ProceduralGuidelines(2011), online: Government of Saskatchewan <www.saskimmigrationcanada.
ca/sinp-procedural-guidelines> [Saskatchewan, Guide]; Nova Scotia Immigration, Nova Scotia
Nominee ProgramSkilled Workers Stream Application Guide (2013), online: Nova Scotia Immigration

<novascotiaimmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/ApplicationGuideNSNP

SW 1August2014

Final.pds> [Nova Scotia, Guide].

48.

Bellissimo, supra note 30 at 268.

49. See, e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Agreement for Canada Yukon Co-operation
on Immigration, Annex A ProvincialNominees (2008), online: CIC <htp://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
department/laws-policy/agreements/yukon/can-yukon-agree-2008.asp> at s 3.3, which states: "In

exercising its nomination authority under this Agreement, Yukon will follow the procedures and
criteria for nomination established by Yukon, as amended from time to time...." All agreements
contain similar dispositions.
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contrary to what has been argued elsewhere," ° there isno absolute answer,
because the nature of these "procedures and criteria," being related to
policy-based programs, is in itself unclear. Indeed, it seems impossible
today to determine whether they should be considered as "procedural
guidelines" or "substantive guidelines," and yet, this characterization
determines the scope of application of the deference owed to decision
makers. For example, if they are considered as equivalent to manuals
and operational bulletins set out for federal immigration officers, the rule
against the fettering of discretion doctrine could apply. This would mean
that we could not expect provincial or territorial decision makers to limit
their discretionary power to the requirements for nomination established
by their respective province/territory. In other words, an applicant could
not seek a review just because the province or territory has rejected the
application-even if the criteria set out had been met.51 But again, since the
program has no statutory basis and the decision makers who administer it
do not exercise statutory authority of any kind, we cannot assert anything
with certainty regarding this point.
On what basis, then, could an applicant contest the application of
discretion by a PTNP decision maker if no legal authority grants this
discretion and determines its scope? It has been established that discretion
can be implied on the grounds of practical convenience (i.e., so the object
and purpose of the act/rule/program can be achieved). 2 In the context of
PTNPs, this would mean that a decision going against the primary purpose
of the nominee programs would trigger review; however, this would
seriously limit the core flexibility and liberal management that is at the
heart of PTNPs.
In sum, the respective roles of the federal, provincial and territorial
governments in the PNTP process are clearly delineated, especially by
agreements between the federal government and each province and
territory. However, the mechanisms by which an applicant dissatisfied
50. Mario D Bellissimo argues that failure to follow the criteria for nomination established by the
province/territory would trigger review. See Bellissimo, supra note 30 at 271.
51. The fettering of discretion doctrine states that decision makers cannot limit their discretionary
power to guidelines that have a non-mandatory nature. For more onthis topic, see Canada(Citizenship
andlmmigration)v Thamotharem,2007 FCA 198,366 NR 301; Restrepo Benitez v Canada(Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 FCA 199, [2008] 1 FCR 156. See also France Houle, "Thamotharem and

Guideline 7 of the IRB: Rethinking the Scope of the fettering of Discretion Doctrine" (2008) 25:2
Refuge 103 at 104-106, 108.
52. See Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp, [1947] 2

All ER 680, cited in Guy Regimbald, Canadian Administrative Law, 1st ed (Markham, Ontario:
LexisNexis, 2008) at 178-179. See also Patrice Garant with the collaboration of Philippe Garant &
Jerome Garant, Droit administratif, 6th ed (Montreal: tditions Y Blais, 2010) at 199; Interpretation
Act, RSC, 1985, c 1-21, s 311(2).
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with a decision made by provincial or territorial authorities may seek
remedial relief remain unclear. This is so because the PTNP process is not
set out in any provincial or territorial legislation, and given that the power
of the provinces and territories to make these decisions flows exclusively
from federal legislation, key questions remain unanswered. For example,
on which basis could an applicant contest the application of discretion
by a PTNP decision maker if no legal authority determines its scope?
Is it correct to assert that failure of the provincial or territorial decision
maker to follow the criteria for nomination established by the province
or territory would automatically trigger review? At the time of writing
(July 2014), this particular legislative structure had not been the subject
of examination by case law. In fact, judicial review had been sought two
times by PTNP applicants, once in Manitoba regarding a decision under
the Manitoba nominee program53 and once in New Brunswick regarding
a delay extension for an application for judicial review of a decision
under the New Brunswick nominee program,54 and the only point made
by Keyser J.of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in Jiang is that
the flexibility of these programs is crucial, thus underlining that program
requirements could vary from one PTNP stream to another.5 Therefore,
questions pertaining to the legal ground for provincial decision makers'
discretionary powers and the scope of deference owed to them have not
yet been addressed. It is to be hoped that this will happen in the near future
because it is highly problematic that decision makers who exercise public
power at the provincial level are not held accountable for exercising their
power in conformity with law (even where that law grants significant
discretion), as is the case at the federal level. On that note, it is difficult to
see how the federal government can delegate an immigration function by
agreement to another level of government, and how that function can be
insulated from judicial review when, if the federal government retained it,
there is no question that it would be reviewable.
The alternative would be that these programs are "law" (i.e., there
is provincial or territorial legislation dealing with the powers and
responsibilities of provinces or territories in the PTNP process). Then,
the decisions made under PTNPs would be judicially reviewable for
conformity with that law. As the Quebec example shows, there are benefits
for applicants accruing from an immigrant selection process clearly rooted
in legislative authority. In Quebec, the process for obtaining the Quebec

53.

See Jiang,supra note 34.

54.
55.

Lingyun v New Brunswick, 2013 NBQB 59, 400 NBR (2d) 50.
Jiang,supra note 34 at para 24-26.
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selection certificate (CSQ)5 6-the equivalent of a provincial or territorial
nomination-is clearly explained and regulated in An Act respecting
immigration to Qubec,57 its Regulation Respecting the Selection of
ForeignNationals,58 and other appended regulations."9 Appeal mechanisms
for CSQ applicants are clear and straightforward: the minister's decision

regarding cancellation of a selection certificate may be contested before
the Tribunal Administratif du Qudbec (TAQ) before the 60th day following
the notifications. 6 Section 15 ofAn Act Respecting AdministrativeJustice,
the enabling statute for the TAQ, is written as follows:
The Tribunal has the power to decide any question of law orfact necessary
for the exercise of its jurisdiction. In the case of the contestation of a
decision, the Tribunal may confirm, vary or quash the contested decision
and, if appropriate, make the decision which, in its opinion, should have
been made initially.6'

As the TAQ is an administrative tribunal, an application for judicial
review can be made to the Superior Court. 62 Interestingly, all provinces
and territories are perfectly entitled to adopt such legislation, since each

56.

An applicant wishing to come as a worker or under a family reunification process must first

obtain a selection certificate, as stated in s 3.1 oftheAnAct respecting immigration to Quebec, RSQ,

c 1-0.2 [Quebec Act]. Its long section 3.3 also states that the selection criteria may be established
under regulations. Thus, ss 2 to 16 of the Regulation Respecting the Selection of Foreign Nationals,

RRQ, c 1-0.2, r 4 [Quebec Regulation], deals with the selection certificate's granting process and
the authorities implied in it, while Division II (s 23-41) deals with the appreciation of the demands
by the Minister. Many references are also made to the various schedules of the Rules, in which the
selection requirements and criteria are described (e.g., Schedule A Selection grid for the economic
class, Schedule B Sponsor's required minimum income, Schedule C Sponsored person's basic needs,
Schedule C-1 Minimum amount required to provide for the sponsored person's basic needs). This
regulation also deals with applicable fees to the different demands.
57. Quebec Act, supra note 56.
58. Quebec Regulation, supra note 56.
59. Two other regulations to the Act, the Regulation respecting the weighting applicable to the
selection offoreign nationals, RRQ, c 1-0.2, r 2, and the Regulation respecting linguistic integration

services,RRQ, c 1-0.2, r 5, also handle selection matters. The former focuses on weighing the selection
criteria (see, e.g., s 1), while the latter establishes languages services offered by the government to help
newly selected applicants improve their skills in French to ease their integration to the labour market
(see, e.g., s 1).
60.
61.
62.

Quebec Act, supra note 56, s 17(b).
An Act Respecting AdministrativeJustice, RSQ, c J-3, s 15.
Tribunal administratif du Quebec, Revision d'une decision du Tribunal, online: Tribunal

administratif du Quebec <http://www.taq.gouv.qc.ca/fr/audience/decision/revision-d-une-decisiondu-tribunal>. See also s 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25, which states that the power
of surveillance and control of any public of private legal person lies before the Superior Court.

544

The Dalhousie Law Journal

province is allowed to legislate in immigration matters.63 However, they
seem to have opted instead "to manage their PTNPs by means of policy
directives in order to maintain flexibility in adjusting [PTNP] programs
to changing economic conditions" (an explanation provided by CIC).64
Although it is doubtful that this will happen soon, the Quebec example
should be followed: provincial and territorial legislation should be
introduced to set out in law the powers and responsibilities of provinces/
territories in the PTNP process. This is crucial to ensure better protection
for PTNP applicants, especially as the PTNP category continues to expand
in depth and numbers year after year.
II. An innovative possibility: Extending the scope offiduciary
relationshipswithin the context ofPTNP applications
As we have shown in Part I, the absence of a legal framework for PTNPs
is such that PTNP applicants are not afforded a fair opportunity to seek
relief in case of a negative decision by a provincial or territorial decision
maker. Based on this assumption, we suggest in this part, as an alternative
and innovative mechanism, that a responsibility or "duty" could be owed
by provincial/territorial decision makers to PTNP applicants, using the
concept of a fiduciary relationship and fiduciary obligation. Fiduciary law
is rooted in the interdependency that now defines many relationships in
our society. As put forward by Rotman:
Fiduciary doctrine has expanded its application to fill the increasing need
to protect those who are dependent on others for particular tasks and to
ensure that relationships
created by the push towards interdependency
65
remain viable.
In our opinion, the mechanism of fiduciary duty adequately portrays
the distinctiveness of the relationship between PTNP applicants and
provincial or territorial decision makers, and most importantly, it can
give applicants an additional recourse if they face a PTNP refusal at the
provincial or territorial level.

63.

According to the ConstitutionAct, supra note 2, s 95, immigration being a shared competence,

provinces are allowed to "make laws in relationto ... Immigration." In addition, the majority of federal/
provincial agreements expressly state that the province may legislate to ensure that their responsibility
regarding the implementation of immigration programs will be respected, see, e.g., CIC, Canada
ManitobaAgreement, supranote 37, s 0.17, that states that "[t]he parties hereto agree on the following
in order to determine their respective areas of activity relating to immigrants, refugees, and temporary
residents in order to meet the needs of Canada and Manitoba: ... d. That Manitoba will exercise its
responsibilities in the development and implementation of programs; policies and legislation...."
64. CIC, Evaluation, supra note 10 at 1-2.
65. Leonard Rotman, ParallelPaths: FiduciaryDoctrine and the Crown Native Relationship in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 152 [Rotman, ParallelPaths].
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In Canada, even if fiduciary law has evolved throughout the last
decades, "it must be said that [this] law is still in its infancy and requires
further development."66 As oftoday, there is no clear definition ofafiduciary
relationship or a fiduciary duty by courts: each fiduciary relationship needs
to be considered on its own facts to determine if-and which type offiduciary obligations might arise, and that determination rests with the
courts, not with the parties themselves." The absence of a clear definition
has made it possible forthe courts to classify as fiduciaries those who would
not have been so regarded in the past. Thus, the circumstances in which
fiduciary relationships may be found to exist have stretched to encompass
certain factual scenarios, in addition to traditionally recognized categories
where fiduciary relationships are presumed to exist like trustee or solicitorclient relationships. 8 However, the Supreme Court of Canada has on
several occasions69 highlighted that a fiduciary duty outside the traditional
recognized fiduciary relationship will not be found if the relationship does
not possess key characteristics. The three "essential ingredients" giving
rise to fiduciary duties, as stated by Wilson J. in Frame v. Smith,"0 are as
follows:
1. The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power;
2. The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so
as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and

66.

James I Reynolds, A Breach ofDuty: FiduciaryObligationsandAboriginalPeoples, (Saskatoon:

Purich Publishing, 2005) at 127.
67. See Paul B Miller, "A Theory of Fiduciary Liability" (2011) 56:2 McGill LJ 235 at para 5. See
also Donovan Waters, Law ofTrusts in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 406. See finally
Lac Minerals Ltd v InternationalCorona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 at 647, 69 OR (2d) 287
[Lac Minerals]; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada,2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 SCR 245 at para 91-92
[Wewaykum].

68. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes the existence of fiduciary duties in the
doctor-patient relationship. InNorbergv Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226, 92 DLR (4th) 449, the Supreme
Court found that a doctor breached his fiduciary obligations by pressuring his drug-addicted patient
to provide him with sexual favors in exchange for drugs (see also Mclnerney v MacDonald, [1992] 2
SCR 138, 93 DLR (4th) 415). Another example is the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that parents,
guardians and priests owe fiduciary duties to children not to abuse them physically and sexually: M(K)
vM(H), [1992] 3 SCR 6, 96 DLR (4th) 289. For more onthis topic, see Leonard I Rotman, "Fiduciary
Law's 'Holy Grail': Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence" (2011) 91:3 BUL
Rev 921 [Rotman, "Holy Grail"]. See also, generally, Rotman, ParallelPaths, supra note 65 at 153,
and Reynolds, supra note 66 at 127.
69. See Framev Smith,[1987] 2 SCR 99, 42 DLR (4th) 81; Lac MineralsLtd, supra note 67; Norberg
v Wynrib, supra note 68; Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada (Departmentof Indian Affairs and
Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344, 130 DLR (4th) 193. See also Alberta v ElderAdvocates
ofAlberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 SCR 261 at paras 30, 33 and 34 [ElderAdvocates].
70. Framev Smith, supra note 69 at para 60.
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3.

The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
These characteristics have been clarified in Elder Advocates and
recently reiterated in ManitobaMetis:
First, the evidence must show that the alleged fiduciary gave an
undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of abeneficiary....
Second, the duty must be owed to a defined person or class of persons
who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense that the fiduciary has
a discretionary power over them....
Finally, to establish a fiduciary duty, the claimant must show that the
alleged fiduciary's power may
affect the legal or substantial practical
7
interests of the beneficiary. 1
Among these characteristics, dependency (or vulnerability) to the
fiduciary's exercise of discretionary power is a significant factor relevant to
the imposition of fiduciary duties. However, there are many relationships
in which one person becomes vulnerable to another's actions, which do
not sufficiently evidence the fiduciary character of an interaction. An
interesting example in this area is the relationship between pedestrians
and the operators of motor vehicles. Rotman explains:
Pedestrians and motorists have unequal power, as the latter are in control
of heavy and powerful machinery that can cause serious bodily harm
or death. Further, pedestrians become rather vulnerable to motorists
once they step off the sidewalk. The law recognizes this inequality by
providing a right of way to pedestrians lawfully crossing streets. This
does not create a fiduciary relationship, however, but imposes legal
weight to enforce a socially valuable norm and prescribes penalties for
non-conformity. 72
Thus, as Rotman puts it,"[t]he simple inequality of parties is not...
determinative of the existence of a fiduciary relationship."7 3 There must
be an "implicit dependency"-inherent in the nature of the relationship
itself-where one party is "at the mercy" of the other's discretion.7 4 In
other words, one party's state of vulnerability should not be understood
as resulting from an initial inequality between the two parties, but rather
as stemming from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation itself.

71. ElderAdvocates, supra note 69 at paras 30, 33 and 34. See also ManitobaMetis FederationInc
v Canada(Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 50, [2013] 1 SCR 623 [ManitobaMetis].
72. Rotman, "Holy Grail," supra note 68 at 931.
73. Ibid.
74. Lac Minerals,supra note 67 at 599, para 34 and 35, citing HospitalProductsLtdv United States
Surgical Corp (1984), 55 ALR 417 at 488 [HospitalProductsLtd].
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Even if the fiduciary concept was first used in the context of private
relations, the Supreme Court in Guerin v. The Queen 5 "introduced a far
more expansive concept of the 'fiduciary principle' and took the law into
new, uncharted, and uniquely Canadian waters. 7' Guerin is a landmark
Supreme Court of Canada decision that established the Canadian
government's fiduciary duty to First Nations, a trust-like77 relationship
stemming from the sui generis right of Aboriginal title. In Guerin,
the Court ruled that the distinctiveness of the fiduciary relation existing
between the Indian band and the Federal Government, based on a mix of
private and public interests, could lead to a fiduciary duty.
Since Guerin, the presence of a fiduciary relationship between
Aboriginal groups and the Crown has been well established. 78 But, as
of today, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend the scope of
9
fiduciary duties to other matters than the Crown-Aboriginal relationship.
In fact, only one recent case, Authorson," discussed the application of
fiduciary concepts to a public entity (the federal government) outside a
Crown-Aboriginal relationship. Disabled veterans were contesting the
mismanagement of funds by the Crown, arguing that a breach of a fiduciary
obligation had occurred. Both the Ontario Superior Court and the Court of
Appeal accepted the applicants' argument. The Supreme Court overturned
the Court of Appeal decision, but it did so because "any claims based on
this breach were statute-barred."8 1 The Supreme Court therefore did not
change the recognition made by the inferior courts that the Crown owed a
fiduciary duty to the disabled veterans. According to Hogg, Monahan and
Wright, this timid unwillingness to extend the concept in the public realm
is because there is a tendency by Courts to associate a "public action" to a
"public solution" (even if a public action may have private consequences),
which brings us back to the traditional mechanism ofjudicial review." But
75.
76.
77.

Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 385 [Guerin].
Reynolds, supra note 66 at 127-128.
Aboriginal title refers to the inherent Aboriginal right to land or a territory. The Canadian

legal system recognizes Aboriginal title as a sui generis, or unique collective right to the use of and
jurisdiction over a group's ancestral territories.
78.

Reynolds, supra note 66 at 143-144.

79.

This scope as even become narrower in Crown-Aboriginal relationships. See Wewaykum, supra

note 67; see also ManitobaMes, supra note 71.
80. Authorson v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 39, [2003] 2 SCR 40 [Authorson].
81. Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty's Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: New York: Oxford

University Press, 2011) at 155, note 13 [Fox-Decent, Sovereignty's Promise].
82. Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan& Wade K Wright, Liabilityof the Crown (Toronto, ON: Carswell,
2011) at 375, 379. See also: Lome Sossin, "Class Actions Against the Crown: A Substitution for
Judicial Review on Administrative Law Grounds" (2007) 57 UNBLJ 9 at 13 [Sossin, "Class Actions"].
The Court's argument is that "[p]ublic law duties, the performance of which requires the exercise of
discretion, do not typically give rise to a fiduciary relationship," see Guerin, supra note 75 at 385.
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there also appears to be an emerging consensus within the legal community
that "[a] priori assessments are completely inappropriate within the realm
of fiduciary law," since the fiduciary doctrine depends by nature on the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. 3
This has brought scholars such as Fox-Decent to argue strongly for an
extension of the scope of fiduciary relationships and obligations to public
law settings. Fox-Decent believes that administrative law principles,
such as procedural fairness and natural justice, should be included in the
fiduciary discourse, since fiduciary relationships stem from equitable
principles in administrative law. In fact, administrative law principles are
included in the fiduciary relationship. 4 Thus, there are good reasons for
seeing administrative law, not only through the lens of legality, but also
through the lens of equitable relationships. In this context, fiduciary duties
could be applied to other important areas, "ranging from social welfare
to the immigration and refugee process,"85 if it can be proven that the
fiduciary relationship is a distinctive kind of legal relationship in which
one person (the fiduciary) has enough power or discretion to negatively
affect the other party's interests (the beneficiary).86
Thus, it is clear from the case law and the evolution of fiduciary law
that fiduciary relationships and duties have been found outside the private
realm. They have indeed been found to apply to relationships between
vulnerable groups and public authorities, and the emphasis has been put on
the element of discretionthat is to be exercised bythe fiduciary overpractical
interests of the beneficiary. In the context of PTNPs, we hypothesize that
the unique and unusual nature of the relationship between the provincial
or territorial government and PTNP applicants may be thought of as a
fiduciary relationship. Our reasoning rests on two main characteristics
proper to PTNPs: first, their ambiguous legal character and functioning;
second, their unique and growing role in Canadian immigration, including

83. Rotman, Parallel Paths, supra note 65 at 155. See also Lome Sossin, "Public Fiduciary
Obligations, Political trusts, and the Equitable Duty of Reasonableness in Administrative Law" (2003)
66 SaskL Rev 129 at 137-139 [Sossin, "Public Fiduciary Obligations"]. See finally Guerin,supranote
75 at 384.

84. See Fox-Decent, Sovereignty's Promise, supra note 81; Evan Fox-Decent, "The Fiduciary
Nature of State Legal Authority" (2005) 31 Queen's U 259 [Fox-Decent, "Fiduciary Nature"]. See
also Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J Criddle, "The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights" (2010) 15:4
Leg Theory 301. See finally Sossin, "Public Fiduciary Obligations," supra note 83, where he explains
(at 131) that the development of administrative law according to the rule of law "has overshadowed
[its] development based on equitable principles."
85. Sossin, "Public Fiduciary Obligations," ibid at 150.
86. Mark R Gillen & Faye Woodman, eds, The Law of Trusts, A Contextual Approach, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) at 840. See also ElderAdvocates,supranote 69 at para 26; Lac
Minerals,supranote 67; Sossin, "Public Fiduciary Obligations," supranote 83 at 134.
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the specific involvement of employers in the application process. As we
show in the following lines, these characteristics meet the requirements of
undertaking, vulnerability and interest set out in the three-part analysis of
ElderAdvocates and reiterated in ManitobaMetis.
As we explained in Part I, the absence of a legal framework for PTNPs
(i.e., they have no statutory basis and the officials who administer them
do not exercise statutory authority of any kind) is likely to negatively
affect the right of PTNP applicants to challenge a negative decision at
the provincial or territorial level. But clearly the issue here for PTNP
applicants is not only at the level of their right to seek remedial relief. As
we have shown elsewhere, selection criteria and processing procedures
under nominee programs change frequently and without prior notice.
Provinces and territories are even entitled to add a new immigration
program (or to remove it) without further notice.87 This creates an
uncertain environment for PTNP applicants. They could miss important
deadlines or be misinformed regarding necessary documents or forms,
which could be fatal to their application. It is also worth noting that each
PTNP has a website with application forms and instructions, but the
information provided is not always straightforward or detailed enough.
Furthermore, with the exception of some provinces that have produced
policy and procedural guidelines on their PTNP websites,88 most PTNPs
do not provide detailed information on their processing procedures. And
for the few provinces that supply applicants with guidelines and manuals,
these documents cannot be considered as having legal authority.89 It
should also be noted that some PTNPs were already reported to suffer
from inefficiencies, processing irregularities and lack of oversight.9" In
sum, the lack of transparency of PTNPs is such that PTNP candidates
may not be in a position to form reliable expectations about eligibility
requirements or about the ongoing availability of whole program streams.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the "distinctiveness" of the
relationship considered in Guerin could be applicable in the case at hand.
In other words, the potentially arbitrary power of the province is likely to
negatively affect the PTNP applicants' interests in several ways.
87.

See mainly Nakache & D'Aoust, supra note 18; Baglay & Nakache, supra note 29.

88. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Guide and Nova Scotia Guide, supra note 47. Government of
Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program, SINP Procedural Guidelines (2011),

online:

<http://www.saskimmigrationcanada.ca/sinp-procedural-guidelines>;

Nova

Scotia,

Government of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Immigration, Nova Scotia Nominee Program Skilled
Workers Stream Application Guide (2013), online: <http://novascotiaimmigration.ca/sites/default/
files/NSNP Guide Skilledworker.pdf> [Nova Scotia, Guide].
89. Bellissimo, supra note 30 at 268.
90. For more on this topic, see Baglay & Nakache, supra note 29.
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Another element leading to the sui generischaracter of PTNPs currently
lies in the particular role that these programs play in allowing an increasing
number ofnon-citizens to access permanent residency from within Canada.
Fiduciary law wished to preserve and protect interdependency and societal
balance9 1 and PTNPs have in fact been shown to illustrate this balance:
while provinces rely on applicants to fulfil specific labour needs, these
applicants rely on authorities to provide them with fair and unambiguous
conditions under which to apply for permanent residence.
In the past decade there has been an expansion of programs allowing for
two-step migration (defined as transition from a temporary to a permanent
resident status from within the country), in particular for international
students and temporary migrant workers.92 Many PTNPs allow for two-step
immigration. They fit well within this overall trend and likely account for
a substantial part of its growth. For example, from 2005 to 2009 between
thirty-one and fifty-four per cent ofthe total PTNP principal applicants who
received permanent residency were individuals who had been in Canada
on a work permit for four years. Throughout this period, provinces such
as British Columbia (eithty-eight per cent in 2009) and Alberta (eightythree per cent in 2009) had consistently the highest proportions of these
principal applicants. 93 Interestingly, while federal avenues for permanent
residence are available to skilled temporary migrant workers only,94 an
increasing number of these workers have decided to make their transition
from a temporary to a permanent resident status through PTNPs. The
reason is simple: many of them are no longer eligible under existing federal
streams, due to more stringent eligibility requirements, whereas PTNP
streams for skilled migrant workers are usually open to applicants in any

91.

Rotman, ParallelPaths, supra note 65 at 152.

92. For example, in 2012, close to 80,000 former temporary residents transitioned to a permanent
resident status, a considerable increase from the 42,000 that made the transition in 2002. Temporary
migrant workers accounted for the largest increase: in 2012, 48% of all temporary migrants who
transitioned to a permanent status were migrant workers, while in 2002, they constituted only 22.7% :
see CIC, Tables 2012, supra note 11.
93. CIC, Evaluation, supra note 10 at 24 and 32.
94. As of February 2014, the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) is assessed under the points
system and is open to 3 groups of applicants: (a) persons with work experience in 24 eligible skilled
occupations; (b) persons with ajob offer from a Canadian employer; (c) international students enrolled
or recently graduated from a PhD program in Canada. With the Canadian Experience Class (CEC),
applicants must have 12 months of full-time work experience in a skilled occupation in Canada within
the last 36 months and the required level of language proficiency. Finally, the Skilled Trades Program
(STP) allows for immigration of skilled tradespeople who have ajob offer from a Canadian employer,
2 years of work experience in their occupation and a required level of language proficiency. STP was
launched in 2013 and is limited to 3,000 admissions in the first year.
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skilled occupation.95 For low-skilled migrant workers, who are excluded
from gaining permanent residency through federal avenues, PTNPs are
offering unique opportunities to transition to permanent residence. Even
if these transition opportunities are relatively limited (the eligibility is
limited to a narrow list of specific industries or occupations and is subject
to change, depending on local needs), in fact, for the first time, low-skilled

migrant workers other than live-in caregivers are given a chance to switch
from temporary to permanent immigration status in Canada. This point
must be acknowledged, especially now that the federal government has
made it even more difficult for low-skilled migrant workers to remain in
the country.96 However, as we discuss further below, one risk associated
with the creation of new immigration opportunities through PTNPs is the
increased dependence from PTNP applicants on employers, and more
significantly for low-skilled PTNP applicants.
The employer being closely involved in the immigration process of the
migrant worker constitutes another element of the sui generis character of
PTNPs. In the case of a PTNP application by a migrant worker, the employer
has in fact an ultimate say as to whether this worker should stay in Canada.
Thus, this dependence goes far beyond the traditional employee-employer
work relationship. To start with, migrant workers of all skill levels who
95. For more on this topic, see Nakache & D'Aoust, supra note 18. See also Baglay & Nakache,
supra note 29. An important point of clarification: in Canada, National Occupational Classification
(NOC) is a standard that classifies and describes all occupations in the Canadian labor market
according to skill types and skill levels: "0" type are senior and middle-management occupations;
"A" level are professional occupations; "B" level are technical and skilled trade occupations; and "C"
and "D" levels are occupations requiring lower levels of formal training. The TFWP was traditionally
based on the NOC and mainly divided between "high-skilled" (NOC skill type 0 or NOC skill level
A or B) and "low-skilled" (NOC skill level C or D). However, in June 2014, the federal government
announced that the TFWP will now be administered based on wage instead of the NOC, arguing that
"1wage is a more objective and accurate reflection of skill level and labour need in a given area." The
government explains: "Temporary Foreign workers being paid under the provincial/territorial median
wage will be considered low-wage, while those being paid at or above will be considered high-wage"
(see Employment and Social Development Canada, infra note 96, at 7-8). Given the novelty of this
measure and the lack of clarity concerning this measure, we have chosen to refer to the previous
categories based on the NOC. Therefore, in this paper, "low-skilled migrant worker' is understood as
a worker performing ajob in NOC C and D occupations whereas "high-skilled migrant worker" refers
to a migrant worker performing jobs in NOC 0, A or B.
96. Except for live-in caregivers who are given the opportunity to apply for permanent residency
after having completed two years of authorized full-time employment within three years of their entry
into Canada (this provision can be found in IRPA, supra note 4, ss 110-115), low-skilled migrant
workers are currently barred from permanent residency trough other existing federal streams. What's
more, in June 2014, the federal government introduced a cap to limit the proportion of low-wage
migrant workers admitted to Canada and has reduced their length of stay, sending a clear message
that these workers are not welcome to settle in Canada. For more on the most recent changes to the
Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), see: Employment and Social Development Canada,
Overhaulingthe Temporary Foreign Worker Program:Putting CanadiansFirst(2014), online: ESDC

<publications.gc.ca/collections/collection-2014/edsc-esdc/Em4 -1-2014.eng.pdf>.
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apply under a PTNP have to demonstrate that they have a job offer from
a local employer. If there is a change in the employment status of the
migrant worker prior to attaining nomination (e.g., they lose their job or
their temporary work permit expires), the application for nomination may
be cancelled.97 In addition, workers in low-skilled positions are usually
required to have worked for their employer for a certain period of time
prior to nomination, a requirement that does not normally apply to skilled
workers.98 What is more, employers are often required to undertake specific
responsibilities towards nominees in the low-skilled category (such as
facilitating the search for housing at a reasonable cost or providing for
English or French training where candidates are not proficient in one of
these languages) or undertake settlement and retention obligations.99 Thus,
an employer holds significant power over the worker in the nomination
process. In the case of low-skilled migrant workers, employers have an
even greater effect on the outcome of the process and, consequently, on the
possibility for low-skilled migrant workers to eventually reach permanent
residence. Although the vast majority of employers are good ones, there is
nevertheless a danger that the power given to them within the nomination
process may be abused, as temporary migrant workers (especially the lowskilled ones who have virtually no opportunity to independently immigrate
to Canada, except under PTNPs) may feel compelled to put up with abusive
practices in order not to jeopardize their chances of nomination.00
A look at the Alberta Immigrant Nominee Program illustrates the
employer's involvement in the application process."' In June 2013, an
employer who sponsored low-skilled workers in the "Semi-Skilled
Workers Category" had to provide a job offer, obtain a Labour Market

97. For more on this topic, see Nakache & D'Aoust, supra note 18.
98. For low-skilled workers, see, e.g., Alberta, Semi-skilled Worker Criteria(2013), online: Alberta
<www.albertacanada.com/immigration/immigrating/ainp-eds-semi-skilled-criteria.aspx>
[Alberta,
Semi-skilled]. See also Nova Scotia, Guide, supra note 47 at 6. For skilled workers, see, e.g., Alberta,
Skilled Worker Criteria(2013), online: Alberta <www.albertacanada.com/immigration/immigrating/
ainp-eds-skilled-worker-criteria.aspx> [Alberta, Skilled].
99. See, e.g., Nova Scotia, Guide, supra note 47 at 9. See also, Yukon, Yukon Nominee Program
Settlement and Retention Plan (2012), online: <http://www.immigrationgov.yk.ca/pdf/ynp
settlement retention.pdf>; Saskatchewan, Ministry of Economy SINP Hospitality Sector Project
Recruitment and Settlement Plan, online: <www.saskimmigrationcanada.caSINP-500-4/>.
100. Nakache & D'Aoust, supra note 18; Baglay & Nakache, supra note 29. See also Canadian
Council for Refugees, Migrant Workers Provincial andfederal report cards (2013), online: CCR
<ccrweb.ca/files/migrant-worker-report-cards.pdf> [Canadian Council for Refugees, "Report cards"].
101. Alberta, Semi-skilled, supra note 98.
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Opinion,"' make sure the candidate fulfills the requirements and establish
a settlement and retention plan.10 3 This stream also specified that the
worker needs to have been working in Alberta for two years on a work
permit before applying, something not required for skilled workers.0 4
The fact that PTNPs bind migrant workers so closely to employers
has been seen by some critics of the current immigration system as
"exacerbating rather than relieving some of the real insecurities that
figure prominently in the [Temporary Foreign Worker Program]." 10 5 For
example, in a 2009 report of the Alberta Federation of Labour, the former
labour advocate for migrant workers noted:
A key feature of PNPs is that they are employer driven. The employer
starts the process and recommends foreign workers for the program.
Their role of pre-selection shapes significantly the makeup of workers
accepted into the program. It also creates an impression among workers
that they are beholden to the... sponsoring employer. The Advocate has
heard reports of unhappy employers threatening to withdraw workers
from the PNP .... Other employers use this program as a further excuse
to exploit workers who desperately want to immigrate. Many dangle
the possibility of nomination in the AINP to ensure acquiescence to
unreasonable requests such as unpaid work, additional work, etc.0 6

102. Until recently, a Labour Market Opinion (LMO) was required by the federal government from
the employer to show that no Canadian worker is available to perform the job the employer is trying
to fulfill, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Labour Market Opinion Basics (2013), online:
CIC <www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/employers/lmo-basics.asp>. In June 2014, the labour market test
that allows employers to bring migrant workers to Canada was transformed from a LMO to a new
Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) process that is, according to the government, "more
comprehensive and rigorous": see Employment and Social Development Canada, supra note 96 at 9.
103. As mentioned above, settlement and retention plans for employers can also be found in other
provinces, see supra note 99.
104. See Alberta, Skilled and Alberta, Semi-skilled, supra note 98. In this regard, it is worth noting
that the Alberta government introduced in June 2013 a rule which allowed migrant workers to apply
for permanent residency on their own until the end of November 2013. While this announcement was
good news for migrant workers, since they no longer needed to be sponsored by their employers, these
changes remained limited to very specific in demand jobs and were of a very short duration There is
also today no indication that other provinces/territories are willing to follow the Alberta example. For
more on this topic, see Canadian Press, infra note 114.
105. Jamie Baxter, "Precarious Pathways: Evaluating the Provincial Nominee Programs in Canada.
A research paper for the Law Commission of Ontario" (2010), online: Law Commission of Ontario
<www.lco-cdo.org/baxter.pdf>. These insecurities are mainly linked to the restrictive nature of the
work permit (i.e., migrant workers are often tied to one job, one employer and one location). For more
on this topic, see Nakache & Kinoshita, supra note 16.
106. Alberta Federation of Labour, "Entrenching Exploitation. The Second Report of the Alberta
Federation of Labour Temporary Foreign Worker Advocate" (2009) at 17-19, online: AFL <http:/
www.afl.org/index.php/View-document/123 -Entrenching-Exploitation-Second-Rept-of-AFLTemporary-Foreign-Worker-Advocate.html>.
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Therefore, in the specific context described above, employers' level of
power over their workers is expanding far beyond the traditional employeremployee relationship since without the employer migrant workers cannot
be nominated and consequently cannot apply for permanent residency.
This vast power given to employers has the potential to render migrant
workers particularly dependent on employers.
The above discussion illustrates PTNPs' sui generis nature, based in
their ambiguous legal character and functioning, their unique and growing
role in Canadian immigration, and the specific involvement of employers
in the application process of a good number of PTNP applicants. All these
characteristics meet the three-part analysis set out by the Supreme Court
to establish a fiduciary relationship.
First, "the evidence must show that the alleged fiduciary gave an

undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary."
While this undertaking "may be the result of the exercise of statutory

powers, the express or implied terms of an agreement," '

it can also be

implied from the relationship between the parties. As stated in Galambos,
[t]his does not mean.., that an express undertaking is required. Rather, the
fiduciary's undertaking may be implied in the particularcircumstancesof
the parties'relationship.Relevant to the enquiry of whether there is such
an implied undertaking are considerations such as professional nonns,
industry or other common practices and whether the alleged0fiduciary
8
induced the other party into relying on the fiduciary ' loyalty.1
It is true that outside the Crown-Aboriginal context, "the requirement of
undertaking to act in the alleged beneficiary's interest will typically be
lacking where what is at issue is the exercise of a government power or
discretion."" 9 However, based on the assertion that fiduciary relationships

107. Galambos v Perez, 2009 SCC 48 at para 77, [2009] 3 SCR 247 [Galambos]. See also Elder
Advocates, supra note 69 at para 32.
108. Galambos,supra note 107 at para 79 [our emphasis].
109. Elder Advocates, supra note 69 at para 42. This wording can be compared to the one used in
Guerin, supra note 75 at 384 ("where by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking,
one party has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with it a
discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary. Equity will then supervise the
relationship by holding him to the fiduciary's strict standard of conduct," as cited in J Timothy S
McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and itsFiduciaryDuties to AboriginalPeoples (Markham (ON):
LexisNexis, 2008) at 47) and in Hospital ProductsLtd., supra note 74 at 454 ("to act for or on behalf
of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the
interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense"), which could be seen as less restrictive. An
example of the lack of interest facing government discretion can be found in ManitobaMetis, supra
note 71. In that case, the applicant alleged that the government had not preserve lands facing the arrival
of settlers, the Court held that this first criterion was not met, since the interest of the beneficiary did
not supersede other legitimate concerns related to broader settlement.
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are fact specific and not "pre-established," the assessment of the particular
nature of PTNPs is essential. In the case of PTNPs, we could argue that
it is the interdependency between the province and the applicant that
would support such an undertaking: the necessity for provinces to fulfil
labour needs would justify the necessity to provide applicants with a
clear and fair application process, therefore acting in their best interest
in the particular situation of their immigration to Canada. Moreover, a
suggestion could also be made to the effect that discretion always takes
part of the fiduciary's mandate and is inherent to this mandate, and should
therefore not vary according to the kind of fiduciary relationship analyzed.
The second characteristic is that "[t]he duty must be owed to a
defined person or class of persons who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary
in the sense that the fiduciary has a discretionary power over them."11
As discussed above, it must be acknowledged that a fiduciary duty will
not arise whenever one person exercises power over another vulnerable
person. However, if we look at the particular nature of PTNPs, our
previous discussion of the vulnerability of all PTNP candidates within the
application process in general (given the lack of reliable information on
how to apply, on which criteria, and how to challenge a negative decision
by a provincial/territorial decision maker), and of migrant workers in
particular, highlights the fact that there is an implicit dependency within
the PTNP structure where the PTNP applicant could be seen at the mercy
of the decision maker's/employer's discretion.
Finally, the key criterion requires that the claimant must show that
the alleged fiduciary's power may affect the legal or substantial practical
interests of the beneficiary. This interest "must be a specific private law
interest to which the person has a pre-existing distinct and complete legal
entitlement.1 1 1 This requirement can be answered by looking more closely
at the duty that the fiduciary would owe to the beneficiary. While sufficient
12
interest has been recognized as being ones akin to a property law interest,
we believe that, as for the determination of the existence of a fiduciary
duty, the scope and content of the duty itself will depend on the context.1 3
Facing the vague bundle of criteria and requirements that form part of
the application process, the primary duty the provincial decision maker
would owe is rooted in procedural rights and on the duty to act reasonably.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid at para 51 [emphasis omitted].
112. For example, protection of land in Guerin, supra note 75, or protection of funds inAuthorson,
supra note 80.
113. CanadianAerov O'Malley, [1974] SCR 592 [CanadianAero],cited in Reynolds, supra note 66
at 140.
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For example, the applicant could expect from the provincial or territorial
decision maker the provision of clear, complete and up-to-date information
on websites, as well as reasons for refusals and reconsideration process in
due form. In various situations, websites provide the list of requirements
under which an applicant will be assessed, but this list often features the
'
words "include but is not limited to"114
and is changed abruptly without
notice. In light of that, how can one be sure what criteria are relied upon by
the authority to make its decision? The duty to act fairly could also amount
to respecting legitimate expectations of an applicant who, when meeting
all the requirements presented in guidelines or on websites, legitimately
expects to be accepted or to receive an explanation as to why he was
refused. And even then, Keyser J.in Jiangreminds us that "[n]ot everyone
who meets all of the criteria is guaranteed nomination by the Province
because of the quota system."11"5
This duty to act fairly has also been extended to the application
and respect of legislations that offer certain protections for migrant
workers enacted by various provinces. For example, Manitoba's Worker
Recruitment and ProtectionAct ensures that employers and recruiters are
registered with the provincial government and prohibits the collection of
fees from workers. 6 Nova Scotia recently amended its Labour Standards
Code,117 providing similar protections, as well as prohibiting employers
from confiscating workers' documents (such as passports or work
permits). 8 The new section 89F(1), for instance, states that
no employer shall reduce the wages of a foreign worker employed by the
employer, or reduce or eliminate any other benefit, term or condition of
the foreign worker's employment that the employer undertookto provide
as a result ofparticipatingin the recruitmentof a foreign worker." 9
This provision seems to suggest that anything the employer does to
recruit the worker cannot be subsequently taken back. Along with the duty
to act fairly, these provisions could constitute the basis for the beneficiary/
applicant's interest, therefore supporting the existence of a fiduciary duty.

114. See, e.g., Alberta, Semi-skilled Worker Criteria,supranote 98.

115. Jiang,supra note 34 at para 41. This quota system is also present inAlberta, see Canadian Press,
"Alberta changing rules on foreign workers," Global News (20 June 2013), online: Global News
<globalnews.ca/news/657739/alberta-changing-rules-on-foreign-workers/>.
116. Worker Recruitment and ProtectionAct, SM 2008, c 23, ss 11(1) and 15(1). See also Canadian

Council for Refugees, "Report Cards," supra note 100.
117. Labour Standards Code, RSNS 1989, c 246. Enacted in 2011, the amendments entered into force
on 1 May 2013.
118. Ibid, s 89G(2).
119. Ibid, s 89F(1) [emphasis added].
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The issue of the nature of potential remedy in the case of a breach of
fiduciary duty is also at stake. It could be said that finding the presence
of a fiduciary duty would open the door to equitable remedies-fiduciary
duty being a creation of equity-such as the possibility of injunction,
but answering this question in further detail is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research. Suffice it to say here that the Supreme
Court has given indication that fiduciaries must "answer for their default
according to their gain."12
In sum, even if its scope of application remains to be clarified, fiduciary
duty is a promising concept in the context of PTNP applications. While the
above analysis brings the actual case law to its limits and leads us to think
outside the box, it however brings us back to the core elements of fiduciary
law: a fact-specific, case-by-case assessment, a particular attention to the
situation of vulnerable groups, a step towards the growing recognition of
the government as fiduciary, and a duty to provide a fair environment to
people with whom we are interdependent.
Conclusion
Facts and statistics show it: the face of Canadian immigration is changing.
More and more people get permanent residency under one of the multiple
categories of the eleven Provincial and Territorial Nominee Programs, and
the annual number of economic immigrants admitted under these streams
is about to surpass the annual number of economic immigrants admitted
under other federal streams. Facing this new and growing reality, are
provinces and territories ready to offer applicants the appropriate legal
remedies they deserve in case of contestation of a PTNP decision? Some
PTNPs offer an internal reconsideration process, but is it enough?
As we have shown throughout our examination of legal recourse
for PTNP applicants, the route to judicial review, which would be the
most probable means of challenging a nomination refusal, is not easy.
This is because the legal configuration of PTNPs allows for a broad and
vague-potentially arbitrary-scope of discretion of decision makers.
An alternative would be that these programs become "law"; then the
decisions made under them would be judicially reviewable for conformity
with that law. However, it is unlikely to happen because flexibility is the
key characteristic of PTNPs. Such flexibility is seen as "essential" for the
provinces and territories: it allows them (and their employers) to adapt
their programs, categories and streams to changing economic and labour
needs. But clearly this flexibility comes at a price for PTNP candidates,

120. CanadianAero, supra note 112 at 622.
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as these programs are extremely difficult to navigate and do not provide
applicants with a satisfactory avenue to challenge a province's/territory's
decision. Of particular concern is the practical control that employers end
up exerting over nominee selection and settlement processes, especially
when such control is the only way for low-skilled applicants to get a more
secure (i.e., permanent) status in Canada.
If, for the sake of convenience, provinces and territories are indeed
not willing to change anything in the current structure of PTNPs, we
believe that it is essential to find ways to better protect the rights of noncitizens in the PTNP application process. Following this line of reasoning,
we have suggested, as an alternative mechanism, that the unique nature,
framework and functioning of these programs could lead provincial and
territorial decision makers to owe a fiduciary duty to PTNP applicants.
We are aware that our solutions will be objectionable to some, and for
various reasons, but given the increasing importance of PTNPs within the
Canadian immigration landscape and the lack of legal analysis in this area,
we hope that they will help start a much needed discussion on the impact
of PTNPs on non-citizens' rights and protections.

